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Abstract. Mediation is a process, in which both parties agree to re-
solve their dispute by negotiating over alternative solutions presented by
a mediator. In order to construct such solutions, mediation brings more
information and knowledge, and, if possible, resources to the negotiation
table. The contribution of this paper is the automated mediation ma-
chinery which does that. It presents an argumentation-based mediation
approach that extends the logic-based approach to argumentation-based
negotiation involving BDI agents. The paper describes the mediation
algorithm. For comparison it illustrates the method with a case study
used in an earlier work. It demonstrates how the computational mediator
can deal with realistic situations in which the negotiating agents would
otherwise fail due to lack of knowledge and/or resources.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Dispute resolution is a complex process, depending on the will of involved par-
ties to reach consensus, when they are satisfied with the result of negotiation,
which allows them to partially or completely fulfil their goals with the available
resources. In many cases, such negotiation depends on searching for alternative
solutions, which requires an extensive knowledge about the disputed matter for
sound argumentation. Such information may not be available to the negotiating
parties and negotiation fails. Mediation, a less radical alternative to arbitration,
can assist both parties to come to a mutual agreement. This paper presents an
argumentation-based mediation system that builds on previous works in the field
of argumentation-based negotiation. It is an extension of the work presented in
[1] and focuses on problems where negotiation stalled and had no solution. In [1]
agents contain all the knowledge and resources needed to resolve their dispute -
a relatively strong assumption in the context of real world negotiations. Agents
present arguments, which their opponent can either accept, reject, or they can
negotiate on a possible solution. As mentioned earlier, lacking knowledge or re-
sources may lead to an unsuccessful negotiation. In many cases, such knowledge
or even alternative resources may be available, but agents are not aware of them.
Our extension proposes a role of a trust-worthy mediator that possesses ex-
tensive knowledge about possible solutions of mediation cases, which it can adapt
to the current case. Mediator also has access to various resources that may help
to resolve the dispute. Using this knowledge and resources, as well as knowledge
and resources obtained from agents, the mediator creates alternative solutions,
which become subject to further negotiation. Furthermore, mediator is guaran-
teed to be neutral and considered trust-worthy by all interested parties.
In the next section, we summarise related work in the field of automatic me-
diation and argumentation-based negotiation. In Section 3, we recall the agent
architecture proposed by Parsons et al. [1] and extend it with the notion of
resources for the purposes of the mediation system. Section 4 presents our medi-
ation algorithm. In Section 5, we revisit the home improvement agents example
from [1] and apply our mediation process. Section 6 concludes this work.
2 Previous Work
Computational mediation has recognized the role of the mediator as a prob-
lem solver. The MEDIATOR [2] focused on case-based reasoning as a single-step
for finding a solution to a dispute resolution problem. The mediation process
was reduced to a one-step case-based inference, aimed at selecting an abstract
“mediation plan”. The work did not consider the value of the actual dialog
with the mediated parties. The PERSUADER [3] deployed mechanisms for problem
restructuring that operated over the goals and the relationships between the
goals within the game theory paradigm, applied to labor management disputes.
To some extent this work is a precursor of another game-theoretic approach
to mediation, presented in [4] and the interest-based negotiation approach in
[5]. Notable are recent game-theoretic computational mediators AutoMed [6] and
AniMed [7] for multi-issue bilateral negotiation under time constraints. They op-
erate within known solution space, offering either specific complete solutions
(AutoMed) or incremental partial solutions (AniMed). Similar to the mediator
proposed in the ‘curious negotiator’ [8], both mediators monitor negotiations
and intervene when there is a conflict between negotiators. The Family Winner
[9] manipulative mediator aimed at modifying the initial preferences of the par-
ties in order to converge to a feasible and mutually acceptable solution. This line
of works incorporated “fairness” in the mediation strategies [10].
In real settings information only about negotiation issues is not sufficient
to derive the outcome preferences [11]. An exploratory study [12] of a multi-
ple (three) issue negotiation setting suggests the need for developing integrative
(rather than position-based) negotiation processes which take into account infor-
mation about the motivational orientation of negotiating parties. Incorporation
of information beyond negotiation issues has been the focus of a series of works
related to information-based agency [13, 14, 15]. Value-based argumentation
frameworks [16], interest-based negotiation [5] and interest-based reasoning [11]
considers the treatment of any kind of motivational information that leads to a
preference in negotiation and decision making.
In this paper we propose a new mechanism for automatic mediation using
argumentation-based negotiation (ABN) as a principal framework for mediation.
ABN systems evolved from classical argumentation systems, bringing power to
agents to resolve potential dispute deadlocks by persuasion of agents in their be-
liefs and finding common acceptance grounds by negotiation [17, 1, 18, 19]. ABN
is performed by exchanging arguments, which represent a stance of an agent re-
lated to the negotiated subject and constructed from beliefs of the agent. Such a
stance can support another argument of the agent, explain why a given offer is re-
jected, or provide conditions upon which the offer would be accepted. Disputing
parties can modify their offer or present a counter-offer, based on the informa-
tion extracted from the argument. Arguments can be used to attack [20] other
arguments, supporting or justifying the original offer. With certain level of trust
between negotiating agents, arguments serve as knowledge exchange carriers [1]
- here we use such mechanisms to exchange information between negotiating
parties and the mediator. The decision of whether to trust the negotiating party
or not is a part of the strategy of an agent. Different strategies are proposed
in [21, 22, 23]. Apart from the strategy, essential are the reasoning mechanisms
and negotiation protocols. Relevant to this work are logic frameworks that use
argumentation as the key mechanism for reasoning [24, 25, 26, 27]. Negotiation
protocols, which specify the negotiation procedures include either finite-state ma-
chines [1], or functions based on the previously executed actions [28]. The reader
is referred to [29] for the recent state-of-the-art in ABN frameworks.
Our ABN framework for mediation allows us to seamlessly design and execute
realistic mediation process, which utilises the power of argumentation, using
agent logics and a negotiation procedure to search for the common agreement
space. We have decided to extend the ABN framework in [1], due to the clarity
of its logics. In the next section we recall the necessary aspects of the work
in [1]. We describe the agent architecture in the ABN systems and define the
components that we reuse in our work. Our agents reason using argumentation,
based on a domain dependent theory specified in a first-order logic. Within the
theory, we encode agent strategies, by defining their planning steps. Apart from
agent theories, strategy is defined also in bridge rules, explained further in the
text. We do not explore a custom protocol, therefore we adopt the one from [1].
3 Agent Architecture
The ABN system presented in [1] is concerned with BDI agents in a multi-
context framework, which allows distinct theoretical components to be defined,
interrelated and easily transformed to executable components. The authors use
different contexts to represent different components of an agent architecture,
and specify the interactions between them by means of the bridge rules between
contexts. We recall briefly the components of the agent architecture within the
ABN system in [1] and add a new “resources” component for mediation purposes.
Units are structural entities representing the main components of the ar-
chitecture. There are four units within a multi-context BDI agent, namely: the
Communication unit, and units for each of the Beliefs, Desires and Intentions.
Bridge rules connect units, which specify internal agent architecture by deter-
mining their relationship. Three well-established sets of relationships for BDI
agents have been identified in [30]: strong realism, realism and weak realism. In
this work, we consider strongly realist agents.
Logics is represented by declarative languages, each with a set of axioms and
a number of rules of inference. Each unit has a single logic associated with it.
For each of the mentioned B, D, I, C units, we use classical first-order logic, with
special predicates B, D and I related to their units. These predicates allow to
omit the temporal logic CTL modalities as proposed in [30].
Theories are sets of formulae written in the logic associated with a unit. For
each of the four units, we provide domain dependent information, specified as
logical expressions in the language of each unit.
Bridge rules are rules of inference which relate formulae in different units.
Following are bridge rules for strongly realist BDI agents:
I : I(α) ⇒ D : D(dαe) B : ¬B(α) ⇒ D : ¬D(dαe)
D : ¬D(α) ⇒ I : ¬I(dαe) C : done(e) ⇒ B : B(ddone(e)e)
D : D(α) ⇒ B : B(dαe) I : I(ddoes(e)e) ⇒ C : does(e)
Resources are our extension of the contextual architecture of strongly real-
ist BDI agents. Each agent can possess a set of resources Rv with a specific
importance value for its owner. This value may determine the order in which
agents are willing to give up their resources during the mediation process. We
define a value function v : S → R, which for each resource φ specifies a value
ϑ ∈< 0, 1 >, v(φ) = ϑ. Set Rv is ordered according to function v.
Units, logics and bridge rules are static components of the mediation system.
All participants have to agree on them before the mediation process starts. The-
ories and resources are dynamic components, they change during the mediation
process depending on the current state of negotiation.
4 Mediation Algorithm
In a mediation process both parties try to resolve their dispute by negotiat-
ing over alternative solutions presented by a mediator. Such solutions are con-
structed, using available knowledge and resources. Agent knowledge is considered
private and is not shared with the other negotiating party. Resources to obtain
alternative solutions may have a high value for their owners or be entirely miss-
ing. Thus, we propose that the role of the mediator is to obtain enough knowledge
and resources to be able to construct a new solution. The mediator presents a
possible solution to agents (in the form of an argument), which they either ap-
prove, or reject (attack). For the purposes of this paper we follow Dong’e notion
of attack [20]. Parties can negotiate over a possible solution to come to a mutual
agreement. Below we formally define the foundations of our algorithm.
Definition 1. ∆ is a set of formulae in language L. An argument is a pair
(Φ, ω), Φ ⊆ ∆ and ω ∈ ∆ such that: (1) Φ 0⊥; (2) Φ ` ω; and (3) Φ is a
minimal subset of ∆ satisfying 2.
A mediation game is executed in one or more rounds, during which both
mediator and agents perform various actions in order to resolve the dispute.
Algorithm 1 describes our proposal of the mediation game. In the beginning
of each round, agents α and β have an opportunity to present new knowledge
to the mediator µ. This new knowledge is helping their case, or helping to re-
solve the dispute. Agents can either present knowledge in the form of formulas
from their theory or new resources. Resources can be presented in ascending
order of importance, one resource in each round or altogether, depending on
the strategy of agents. The mediator obtains knowledge by executing function
Γµi ← GetKnowledge(i), where i ∈ {α, β}. The mediator incorporates knowl-
edge Γµi into theory Γµ, obtaining Γ
′
µ. Please note, that the belief revision op-
erator ⊕ is responsible for automatic elimination of conflicting beliefs from the
theory. Belief revision operator uses argumentation techniques to find the mini-
mal set of non-conflicting arguments. Belief revision allows for automatic Using
the knowledge in Γ ′µ, the mediator tries to construct a new solution by execut-
ing the CreateSolution(Γ ′µ) function. If the solution does not exist and agents
did not present new knowledge in this round, mediation fails. Therefore, it is of
utmost importance that agents try to introduce knowledge in each round. In the
next step, the possible outcomes are:
– When both agents accept the solution, mediation finishes with success.
– When both agents reject the solution, mediator adds the incorrect solution
¬solution and the explanation of the rejection Γµ′i from both agents to its
knowledge Γ ′µ and starts a new mediation round.
– When only one agent rejects the solution, a new negotiation process is initi-
ated, where agents try to come to a mutual agreement (e.g. partial division
of a specific item) resulting to solution′. If this negotiation is successful, the
mediator records solution′ as a new solution and finishes mediation with a
success. If the negotiation fails, the mediator adds the explanation of the
failure Γµ
′′
i and the failed solution to Γ
′
µ and starts a new mediation round.
The mediation process continues till a resolution is obtained, or fails, when
no new solution can be obtained, and no new knowledge can be presented. In
the next section, we revisit the example of home improvement agents from [1]
and apply the mediation algorithm.
5 Case Study: Revisiting Home Improvement Agents
In this example, agent α is trying to hang a picture on the wall. Agent α knows
that to hang a picture it needs a nail and a hammer. Agent α only has a screw,
and a hammer, but it knows that agent β owns a nail. Agent β is trying to
hang a mirror on the wall. β knows that it needs a nail and a hammer to hang
the mirror, but β currently possesses only a nail, and also knows that α has a
hammer. Mediator µ owns a screwdriver and knows that a mirror can be hung
using a screw and a screwdriver.
Input : Agents α, β and the mediator µ. Γα, Γβ and Γµ denote the knowledge
of α, β and µ, while Γµα and Γ
µ
β denote the knowledge presented to
the mediator µ respectively by α and β. ⊕ is a belief revision operator
Output: Resolution of the dispute, or ⊥ if solution does not exists.
1 repeat
2 Γµα ← GetKnowledge (α); // Theory and resources from α
3 Γµβ ← GetKnowledge (β); // Theory and resources from β
4 Γ ′µ ← Γµ ⊕ (Γµα ∪ Γµβ );
5 solution ← CreateSolution (Γ ′µ);
6 if solution = ⊥ and Γµ = Γ ′µ then
7 return ⊥ ; // Missing new knowledge and no solution
8 end
9 if solution 6= ⊥ then
10 〈resultα, Γµ′α 〉 ← Propose(µ, α, solution)
11 〈resultβ , Γµ
′
β 〉 ← Propose(µ, β, solution)
12 Γ ′µ ← Γ ′µ ⊕ (Γµ
′
α ∪ Γµ
′
β )
13 if ¬resultα and ¬resultβ then
14 Γ ′µ ← Γ ′µ ⊕ ¬solution;
15 solution ← ⊥;
16 else if ¬resultα or ¬resultβ then
17 〈solution′, Γµ′′α , Γµ
′′
β 〉 ← Negotiate (solution, α, β);
18 Γ ′µ ← Γ ′µ ⊕ (Γµ
′′
α ∪ Γµ
′′
β )
19 if ¬solution′ then
20 Γ ′µ ← Γ ′µ ⊕ (¬solution ∪ ¬solution′)
21 solution ← ⊥;
22 else
23 solution← solution′
24 end
25 end
26 end
27 Γµ ← Γ ′µ;
28 until solution 6= ∅;
29 return solution
Algorithm 1: Mediation algorithm
The difference with the example in [1] is that mediator owns the knowledge
and resource needed to resolve the dispute µ and not the agents. This reflects
the reality, when clients seek advice of an expert to resolve their problem. As
mentioned in the Section 3, agents α and β are strongly realist BDI agents using
related bridge rules and predicate logic. We now define all the dynamic parts of
the mediation system, i.e. domain specific agent theory and bridge rules1.
1 We adopt following notation: A.* is the theory introduced by the agent α, B.* is the
theory of the agent β, M.* is the mediator’s theory, G.* is the general theory and
R.* are bridge rules
5.1 Agent Theories
What follows, is the private theory Γα of the agent α, whose intention is to hang
a picture:
I : Iα(Can(α, hang picture)) (A.1)
B : Bα(Have(α, picture)) (A.2)
B : Bα(Have(α, screw)) (A.3)
B : Bα(Have(α, hammer)) (A.4)
B : Bα(Have(β, nail)) (A.5)
B : Bα(Have(X,hammer) ∧Have(X,nail) ∧Have(X, picture)→
Can(X,hangPicture))
(A.6)
Please note, that agent α, contrarily to the example in [1], no longer knows
that a mirror can be hung with a screw and a screwdriver. What follows, is the
private theory Γβ of agent β, whose intention is to hang a mirror.
I : Iβ(Can(β, hangMirror)) (B.1)
B : Bβ(Have(β,mirror)) (B.2)
B : Bβ(Have(β, nail)) (B.3)
B : Bβ(Have(X,hammer) ∧Have(X,nail) ∧Have(X,mirror)→
Can(X,hangMirror))
(B.4)
Following is the theory Γµ of the mediator µ, related to the home improve-
ment agents case (please note, that mediator’s knowledge can consist of many
other beliefs, for example learned from other mediation cases):
B : Bµ(Have(µ, screwdriver)) (M.1)
B : Bµ(Have(X, screw) ∧ Have(X, screwdriver) ∧
Have(X,mirror)→ Can(X,hang mirror)).
(M.2)
B : Bµ(Have(X,hammer) ∧Have(X,nail) ∧Have(X,mirror)→
Can(X,hangMirror))
(M.3)
We adopt the following theories from [1] with actions that integrate different
models reflecting real world processes such as change of ownership, and processes
that model decisions and planning of actions. In what follows i ∈ {α, β}).
Ownership. When an agent (X) gives up artifact (Z) to (Y), (Y) becomes
its new owner:
B : Bi(Have(X,Z) ∧Give(X,Y, Z)→ Have(Y, Z)) (G.1)
Reduction. If there is a way to achieve an intention, an agent adopts the
intention to achieve its preconditions:
B : Bi(Ij(Q)) ∧Bi(P1 ∧ . . . ∧ Pk ∧ . . . ∧ Pn → Q)
∧¬Bi(R1 ∧ . . . ∧Rm → Q)→ Bi(Ij(Pl))
(G.2)
Generosity Mediator µ is willing to give up any resource Q
B : Bµ(Have(µ,Q))→ ¬Iµ(Have(µ,Q)). (G.3)
Unicity. When an agent (X) gives an artifact (Z) away, (X) longer owns it:
B : Bi(Have(X,Z) ∧Give(X,Y, Z)→ ¬Have(X,Z)) (G.4)
Benevolence. When agent i does not need (Z) and is asked for it by X, i
will give Z up:
B : Bi(Have(i, Z) ∧ ¬Ii(Have, i, Z) ∧Ask(X, i.Give(i,X, Z))→
Ii(Give(i,X, Z)))
(G.5)
Parsimony. If an agent believes that it does not intend to do something, it
does not believe that it will intend to achieve the preconditions (i.e. the means)
to achieve it:
B : Bi(¬Ii(Q)) ∧Bi(P1 ∧ . . . ∧ Pj ∧ . . . ∧ Pn → Q)→ ¬Bi(Ii(Pj)) (G.6)
Unique choice. If there are two ways of achieving an intention, only one is
intended. Note that we use O to denote exclusive or.
B : Bi(Ii(Q)) ∧Bi(P1 ∧ . . . ∧ Pj ∧ . . . ∧ Pn → Q)
∧Bi(R1 ∧ . . . ∧Rn → Q)→
Bi(Ii(P1 ∧ . . . ∧ Pn))OBi(Ii(R1 ∧ . . . ∧Rn))
(G.7)
A theory that contains free variables (e.g. X) is considered the general theory,
while a theory with bound variables (e.g. α or β) is considered the case theory.
The mediator stores only the general theory for its reuse with future cases. In
addition, an agent’s theory contains rules of inference, such as modus ponens,
modus tollens and particularization.
5.2 Bridge Rules
What follows, is a set of domain dependent bridge rules that link inter-agent
communication and the agent’s internal states.
Advice. When the mediator µ believes that it knows about possible intention
IX of X it tells it to X. Also, when mediator µ knows something (φ) that can
help to achieve intention ϕ of agent X, mediator tells it to X.
Bµ(IX(ϕ))⇒ Tell(µ,X,Bµ(IX(ϕ))) (R.1)
Bµ(IX(ϕ)) ∧Bµ(φ→ IX(ϕ))⇒ Tell(µ,X,Bµ(φ→ IX(ϕ))) (R.2)
Trust in mediator When an agent (i) is told of a belief of mediator (µ), it
accepts that belief:
C : Tell(µ, i, Bµ(ϕ))⇒ B : Bi(ϕ). (R.3)
Request. When agent (i) needs (Z) from agent (X), it asks for it:
I : Ii(Give(X, i, Z))⇒ C : Ask(i,X,Give(X, i, Z)). (R.4)
Accept Request. When agent (i) asks something (Z) from agent (X), and
it is not in intention of (X) to have (Z), it is given to i:
C : Ask(i,X,Give(X, i, Z)) ∧ ¬IX(Have(X,Z))⇒ Ii(Give(X, i, Z)). (R.5)
5.3 Resources
In Section 3, we have introduced the notion of importance of resources, which de-
fines the order in which agents are giving up their resources during the mediation
process. The picture and the hammer depend on the successful accomplishment
of agent’s α goal and have an importance value of 1. Agent β owns a mirror and
a nail, both with importance 1. All other resources have importance 0.
5.4 Argumentation System
Our automatic mediation system uses the ABN system, proposed in [1], which is
based on the one proposed in [24]. The system constructs a series of logical steps
(arguments) for and against propositions of interest and as such may be seen
as an extension of classical logic. In classical logic, an argument is a sequence
of inferences leading to a true conclusion. It is summarized by the schema Γ `
(ϕ,G), where Γ is the set of formulae available for building arguments, ` is a
suitable consequence relation, ϕ is the proposition for which the argument is
made, and G indicates the set of formulae used to infer ϕ, with G ⊆ Γ .
5.5 Mediation
In this section, we follow Algorithm 1 and explain how we can resolve the home
improvement agent dispute using automatic mediation. In comparison to Parsons
et al. [1], our agents do not possess all the knowledge and resources to resolve
their dispute; thus the classical argumentation fails. The mediation algorithm
runs in rounds and finishes with:
1. Success, when both agents accept the solution proposed by the mediator.
2. Failure, when the mediator can not create a new solution and no new knowl-
edge or resources are presented in two consecutive rounds.
The algorithm starts with the mediator gathering information about the
dispute from both agents (function GetKnowledge). In the first round, agents α
and β state their goals, which become part of the mediator’s beliefs Bµ:
B : Bµ(Iα(Can(α, hang picture))) (M.4)
B : Bµ(Iβ(Can(β, hangMirror))) (M.5)
With this new theory, the mediator tries to construct a new solution, and
it fails. Therefore, in the next round, agents have to present more knowledge
or resources. Failing to do so would lead to failure of the mediation process. To
speed things up, we assume that agents presented all the necessary knowledge
and resources in this single step, although this process can last several rounds
depending on the strategy of an agent. For example, if a “cautious” agent owns
more than one resource, it chooses to give up the resource with the lowest im-
portance.
B: Bµ(Have(α, picture)) (M.6) B: Bµ(Have(β, nail)) (M.9)
B: Bµ(Have(α, screw)) (M.7) B: Bµ(Have(β,mirror)) (M.10)
B: Bµ(Have(α, hammer)) (M.8)
With this new information, the mediator is finally able to construct the
solution to the dispute consisting of three different arguments. With the fol-
lowing two arguments, mediator proposes agent β to hang the mirror using the
screw and the screwdriver (M.2), and screw can be obtained from the agent α
and the screwdriver obtained from the mediator itself (Please note, that this
knowledge is part of the support for the presented arguments). The first argu-
ment is: (Iβ(Give(α, β, screw)), P
′
β), where P
′
β is
2:
{(M.2),(M.5),(G.2)} `pt,mp Bµ(Iβ(Have(β, screw))) (M.11)
{(M.7),(G.1)} `mp Bµ(Give(α, Y, screw)→
Have(Y, screw))
(M.12)
{(M.11),(M.12),(G.2)} `pt,mp Bµ(Iβ(Give(α, β, screw))) (M.13)
{(M.13)} `R.1 Tell(µ, β, Iβ(Give(α, β, screw))) (M.14)
{(M.14)} `R.3 Iβ(Give(α, β, screw)) (M.15)
The second argument is: (Iβ(Give(µ, β, screwdriver)), P
′′
β ), where P
′′
β is
{(M.2),(M.5),(G.2)} `pt,mp Bµ(Iβ(Have(β, screwdriver))) (M.16)
{(M.1),(G.1)} `mp Bµ(Give(µ, Y, screwdriver)→
Have(Y, screwdriver))
(M.17)
{(M.16),(M.17),(G.2)} `pt,mp Bµ(Iβ(Give(µ, β, screwdriver))) (M.18)
{(M.18)} `R.1
Tell(µ, β, Iβ(Give(µ, β, screwdriver)))
(M.19)
{(M.19)} `R.3 Iβ(Give(µ, β, screwdriver)) (M.20)
These two arguments represent advices to β on how it can achieve its goal
(B.1) that was communicated to mediator µ as (M.5). Using bridge rule (R.4) β
converts this into the following actions:
{M.15} `R.4 Ask(β, α,Give(α, β, screw)).
{M.20} `R.4 Ask(β, µ,Give(µ, β, screwdriver)).
When both α and µ receive this request, they convert this into accept request
action using bridge rule (R.5). Mediator accepts this request due to the generos-
ity theory (G.3), which defines that it is not an intention of mediator to own
anything. Agent β cannot find a counter-argument that would reject this request
(it does not need the nail) and accepts it. With the screw, the screwdriver, the
mirror and knowledge on how to hang the mirror using these tools, β can fulfil
its goal, and it no longer needs the nail. Therefore, the following argument that
solves the goal of α is also accepted: (Iα(Give(β, α, nail)), Pα), where Pα is:
{(M.3),(M.4),(G.2)} `mp Bµ(Iα(Have(α, nail))) (M.21)
{(M.9),(G.1)} `mp Bµ(Give(β, Y, nail)→ Have(Y, nail)) (M.22)
{(M.21),(M.22),(G.2)} `pt,mp Bµ(Iα(Give(β, α, nail))) (M.23)
{(M.23)} `R.1 Tell(µ, α,Bµ(Iα(Give(β, α, nail)))) (M.18)
{(M.18)} `R.3 Iα(Give(β, α, nail)) (M.19)
we convert this into action, using the bridge rule R.1 into:
{M.19} `R.1 Ask(α, β,Give(β, α, nail)).
When agent β receives this request, β can accept it by the bridge rule (R.5).
This is only possible because of the previous two arguments, when an alternative
plan to hang the mirror was presented to β, otherwise β would not be willing to
give up the nail needed for his plan. Agent β can now decide between two plans
using (G.7); therefore it decides to give α the nail and both agents were able to
fulfil their goals (we assume that β does not want to sabotage the mediation).
2 mp stands for modus ponens and pt stands for particularization
6 Conclusion
Mediation brings more information and knowledge to the negotiation table,
hence, an automated mediator would need the machinery that could do that. Ad-
dressing this issue in an automated setting, we have presented an ABN approach
that extends the logic-based approach to ABN involving BDI agents, presented
in [1]. We have introduced a mediator in the multiagent architecture, which has
extensive knowledge concerning mediation cases and access to resources. Using
both, knowledge and resources, the mediator proposes solutions that become the
subject of further negotiation when the agents in conflict cannot solve the dis-
pute by themselves. We have described our mediation algorithm and illustrated
it with the same case study introduced in [1]. The presence of a mediator in
ABN allows to deal with realistic situations when negotiation is stalled. In this
work we assumed that the agents and the mediator operate within the same on-
tology, describing the negotiation domain. In real settings, the negotiators may
interpret the same term differently. In order to avoid this, mediation will require
the initial alignment of the ontologies with which all parties operate.
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